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Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule 
I. OVERVIEW 
Nepal is in turmoil and the monarchy is in question. 
King Gyanendra had calculated that his authoritarian 
moves since October 2002 would return order to a land 
wracked by Maoist insurgency and political instability 
but he has failed. The seven months since the royal coup 
have seen security degenerate under a royal government 
with no plans for peace and democracy. The Maoists 
seized the initiative by announcing a unilateral three-
month ceasefire on 3 September 2005. The international 
community needs to recognise that its calls for palace/ 
political party reconciliation as the sole path toward 
stability are unrealistic. New lines need to be explored, 
beginning with support for the ceasefire and the tentative 
dialogue underway between the parties and the Maoists. 
The king's actions have marked the definitive end of 
the old status quo. There is no prospect of a stable 
balance of power between palace and parties. The 
monarchy retains control of state instruments, crucially 
the army, but it has alienated other natural allies and 
prompted swelling republicanism. The Maoists are 
militarily strong and control much of the countryside 
but have failed to win popular support. Mainstream 
parties offer the hope of representative leadership but 
have lost legitimacy and must make difficult decisions 
about the monarchy and the Maoists. Civil society is 
finding a voice but cannot supplant the parties and will 
struggle to play a decisive role on its own. 
History may credit Gyanendra for forcing the pace of 
political developments, albeit not as he had hoped. While 
endangering the future of the monarchy, the royal coup 
has prompted a healthy clarification of positions and acted 
as a catalyst for Maoist-parties dialogue. But there are 
many dangers. The Maoists are strong and determined, 
possibly serious about peace talks but also reluctant to 
give up the advantages they have won through force. The 
monarchy is weakened and in a corner; as pressure 
mounts the king, backed by the army, may stage a further, 
more brutal, crackdown on the mainstream opposition. 
The political parties' unity is fragile, and they have to 
reengage with their public while treading a careful line 
between two armed forces hostile to democracy. 
The final pattern of the fallout from the royal coup has 
yet to become clear but some trends are identifiable. 
The Maoist-parties dialogue has been boosted by the 
ceasefire announcement. So far it has set modest aims, 
with no illusions of instant solutions, but it has made 
some progress on building confidence and developing 
an agenda. Popular support for a monarchy that has 
failed to deliver peace or prosperity is declining. Political 
activists have already been joined on the streets by other 
protestors, and mainstream dissent will certainly grow. 
The mainstream parties will have to struggle to regain 
mass support. 
The death rate from the conflict has risen, with 1,574 
fatalities reported from January 2005 through June and 
major clashes in the following two months. If the Maoist 
ceasefire is not reciprocated or does not hold there is 
potential for further escalation. Meanwhile, both the 
economic and humanitarian situations have deteriorated.  
The international community's one-point policy of urging 
the palace and parties to cooperate was reasonable as long 
as there were realistic indications they might oblige. 
However, the king's actions since February 2005 have 
produced a political sea-change, with moderate parties 
moving toward a more republican stance and the Maoists 
urging them to negotiate. Nepal's most influential friends 
need to engage in a serious rethink. They should: 
 welcome the Maoist ceasefire and urge its 
indefinite extension, government reciprocity, and 
that all sides in the conflict seize the opportunity 
for substantive talks; 
 continue suspension of military aid in order to 
maintain pressure on the royal government to 
restore democratic governance and explore all 
avenues to peace talks; 
 replace the traditional insistence on a constitutional 
monarchy alongside parliamentary government as 
the sole path to stability and democracy with an 
unequivocal focus on democracy -- with or without 
the king -- and a negotiated peace; 
 work towards better international policy 
coordination, especially between India, the U.S., 
the EU and the UN, preferably in the form of a 
loose contact group; 
 hold a follow-up to the 2002 London International 
Conference on Nepal, bringing together all major 
players to chart a course towards a principled, 
democratic peace and ensure basic unity of purpose; 
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 support the UN human rights monitoring mission 
with money and political backing; and 
 support mainstream, non-violent democratic 
parties, helping to protect them against attacks 
from both armed sides and planning for a 
potentially difficult transition to democracy. 
There can be no return to the status quo before the 1 February 
coup. Nor can there now be any easy return to the 
political institutions of the 1990 constitution. The king 
has made clear his desire to take Nepal back to the 
absolute monarchy of the 1960s, while the Maoists insist 
on moving straight to a constitutional revision process. 
King Gyanendra's refusal to go back on any of his 
controversial steps, however many diplomatic exit routes 
he is offered, has reduced the chance for compromise. 
The mainstream parties' suspicion of the king's intentions 
and their consequent willingness to envisage abandoning 
the monarchy make a palace climb-down risky. 
The king may yet give in to pressure to reinstate 
democratic institutions but his instinct is to see out his 
all-or-nothing gamble. He may find that he has been 
outflanked by both the Maoists and a resilient political 
mainstream that still embodies most Nepalis' desire for 
peace and democracy. 
II. A ROYAL FAILURE 
A. UNCONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY 
The February 2005 royal coup has failed.1 The king 
started his power grab in October 2002 safe in the 
knowledge that Nepalis were frustrated with party 
factionalism, frequent changes of government, corruption, 
and a failure to bring peace, prosperity and security. If 
palace rule had delivered results, Gyanendra would have 
won some support. But almost three years of direct 
rule have achieved the opposite: four revolving-door 
administrations, a cabinet tainted by corruption and 
criminality, and a steady intensification of the conflict 
which has led to further loss of state control in the 
country. 
 
 
1 On the royal coup and its aftermath see Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°91, Nepal's Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation 
Worse, 9 February 2005; Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 
Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, 24 February 2005; Crisis 
Group Asia Report N°94, Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights 
Crisis, 24 March 2005; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°99, 
Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 
15 June 2005. 
In the months following the 2005 coup, international 
pressure had some effect. Most notably, it left the royal 
government in an awkward limbo -- prevented from 
carrying out the full crackdown the king's advisers had 
envisaged and with no other plan to cope with the 
Maoists and the democratic parties. The palace's true 
intentions have been gradually clarified: there was never 
any real focus on dealing with the insurgency. Rather, 
the priority for the hardline clique around the king has 
been to uproot democracy and restore royal rule. In this, 
the Maoists were actually a help, since they provided an 
excuse for autocracy that could be peddled abroad while 
their grip on the countryside weakened the primary 
enemy, the mainstream parties. 
There has been growing, if belated, realisation that the 
royal government has no intention of hastening the 
return of democracy. Quite the reverse: the one 
constant of its program since February has been the 
effort devoted to undermining democratic institutions 
and politicians. The U.S., which had been strikingly 
patient with the palace, has implicitly recognised that it 
is trying to recreate the non-party Panchayat system 
that existed before 1990. In late June 2005, visiting 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South 
Asian Affairs Donald Camp said that the return to a 
pre-1990 Nepal was unacceptable.2 
The king's call for municipal elections offers no real hope 
for reconciliation and has already been dismissed by the 
political parties. They see it as a ploy to put a democratic 
facade on an autocratic regime and are convinced that any 
local elections run by palace appointees under the 
watchful eye of the army would be far from free and 
fair. They argue that even the continued use of the term 
"constitutional monarchy" is damaging as it implies 
that the king has himself upheld the constitution.3 
B. CORRUPTION AND CRIMINALITY 
A stated priority of the post-February administration has 
been to deal with corruption, but any hopes that royal 
rule would bring clean government were seriously 
misplaced. The political intent was clear from the 
outset, when only "post-1990" cases were targeted. 
The fight against corruption rapidly descended into a 
transparent assault on the king's democratic rivals. 
The Royal Commission for the Control of Corruption 
(RCCC) was condemned from its formation by the 
 
 
2 "Return to pre-1990 Nepal unacceptable: Donald Camp", 
www.nepalnews.com, 28 June 2005. 
3 For a detailed discussion of these arguments, see Crisis 
Group Report, Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal, op. cit. 
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political leaders who knew they would be its targets. 
Domestic and international jurists alike cautioned that its 
structure and functioning were inimical to due process.4 
The U.S. said it was disturbed by the conviction of 
former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and 
described the RCCC as an "extrajudicial organisation".5 
The case involved the awarding of a contract in a large 
Asian Development Bank-backed water project. The 
bank was dismayed that the RCCC refused to consider 
its own thorough investigation of the allegations, which 
had found no evidence of wrongdoing. In September 
2005, the Supreme Court finally gave in to repeated 
petitions and demanded that the RCCC furnish a written 
reply on its constitutionality.6 
The king's own cabinet is hardly beyond reproach. His 
outspoken senior vice chairman, Tulsi Giri, is on the 
blacklist of wilful loan defaulters of the state-owned Nepal 
Bank Limited.7 Despite calls for his resignation -- which 
would seem mandatory given the government's professed 
tough policy on defaulters -- he chose to brazen it out 
with the king's support. On 14 July 2005, state-run Radio 
Nepal announced an expansion of the cabinet, which 
raised more questions about the king's judgement. The 
new ministers included a convicted criminal, the accused 
in a Panchayat-era corruption scam and one of those 
chiefly responsible for the violent repression of the 1990 
democracy movement.  
C. DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY 
Royal rule has been characterised by the systematic 
dismantling of constitutional bodies and processes. The 
initial aim was to cripple the political parties and stifle 
mainstream dissent. Beyond that, the king's confidants 
have aimed incrementally to recreate the Panchayat 
system instituted by King Mahendra, Gyanendra's father, 
in the 1960s. This logic explains most of the structural 
changes the palace has implemented since February 2005. 
In his 1 February address the king stated: "We believe 
that centralisation of authority is against democratic 
 
 
4 For example, Shambhu Thapa, chairman of the Nepal Bar 
Association, counselled that "arguments and legal provisions 
will be futile" in challenging the authority of a body that was 
itself extra-constitutional and designed for political purposes. 
"Legal debate on RCCC meaningless", The Kathmandu 
Post, 24 May 2005. No member of the commission is a legal 
professional. 
5 "U.S. 'disturbed' by Royal Commission verdict", www.kantipur 
online.com, 28 July 2005. 
6 "RCCC asked to furnish reply on its constitutionality", 
www.kantipuronline.com, 4 September 2005. 
7 Nepal Credit Information Bureau blacklist of wilful defaulters, 
16 August 2005, p. 30. 
norms".8 Decentralisation had been a prominent success 
story of the post-1990 period, a crucial driver for local 
development that was creating a sense of grassroots 
democracy. But the royal government has systematically 
reversed these advances. The 1960s Panchayat system 
of zonal commissioners answering directly to the palace 
was reinstated; committees were similarly established to 
monitor political activities and the civil service at the 
local level.9 Palace appointees, given power to dismiss 
government officials, have supplanted elected District 
Development Committee chairmen. Civil service unions 
have been banned, supposedly to avoid politicisation but 
prompting a strong backlash from bureaucrats, while 
reserved jobs for minorities in the civil service have 
been eliminated.10 The constitution has been bypassed in 
important processes such as the selection of a new Chief 
Justice, while the relevant law was not followed for 
appointing new National Human Rights Commission 
members. 
While little has been done to improve security, much 
effort has gone into reviving the symbols and practices 
of absolute monarchy. Freshly painted signs bearing the 
king's sayings appeared around Kathmandu. The Ministry 
of Education started a campaign to develop "nationalist 
education" by ordering that photos of the royal family 
be put in all school textbooks. Nothing indicates a plan 
for reconciliation with the political parties. The most 
revealing comment was a call from retired Chief of 
Army Staff Sachchit Shamsher Rana for the parties to be 
declared "anti-national elements",11 a return to some of 
the Panchayat's most confrontational language. As long 
the palace chooses not to dissociate itself from such 
views, it will be incapable of working with the democratic 
mainstream. 
D. MISDIRECTED MILITARY 
Supporters of the royal takeover argued that an unleashed 
Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) would quickly bring 
the Maoists to heel or force them into dialogue from a 
weakened position. Nothing of the like has happened. 
The army may have contributed to improved security 
within Kathmandu since the coup, but in the countryside 
little has changed. The army is still deployed defensively 
and seems either unwilling or unable to adopt a proactive 
 
 
8 Royal proclamation, 1 February 2005. 
9 Without any explanation, the district monitoring committees 
were dissolved on 3 September 2005. 
10 "King cuts civil service reservations for indigenous peoples", 
Weekly Indigenous News, 26 August 2005, available at 
http://us.oneworld.net. 
11 "Parties should be declared anti-national", The Kathmandu 
Post, 3 July 2005. 
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strategy to return some security to the general population. 
Given the lack of a political strategy, this is not surprising. 
Despite some headline defensive successes, the RNA's 
inability to control the insurgent threat was most starkly 
demonstrated by the Maoists' success in overrunning the 
remote base in Kalikot -- part of a road-building project -- 
on the night of 7 August 2005, killing well over 40 
soldiers and capturing more than 50. 
Token efforts to improve the RNA's image have failed 
to dispel the impression of an army licensed to commit 
systematic human rights violations. Even as the first 
steps were taken to implement the Memorandum of 
Understanding the government agreed to at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in April, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross had to suspend visits to 
places of military detention as it was being denied 
appropriate access to all detainees. The RNA has further 
encouraged the development of village militias, which 
are likely to intensify the conflict and make its resolution 
much more difficult.12 As the RNA has become more 
involved in administration and assumed a more nakedly 
political role, the type of rights violations have changed. 
For example, a journalist with the largest selling 
daily newspaper has received repeated death threats, 
apparently from the security forces, following a critical 
article on RNA failure to respond to allegations of rape 
and unlawful killing.13  
The army has been the king's most solid support: without 
it, the coup would have been impossible, and its political 
role has increased significantly since February 2005. It 
was already the case that local commanding officers, 
who had taken control of the police and displaced civil 
administrators, were becoming the de facto governors 
of districts. Since the coup, their influence has been 
further extended. Retired generals are appointed to 
ambassadorships and other influential posts;14 serving 
officers make unashamed public interventions on policy 
issues.15 As the RNA's vested interests in conflict 
 
 
12 See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°30, Nepal: Dangerous 
Plans for Village Militias, 17 February 2004. 
13 "Kantipur columnist under constant threat", www.kantipur 
online.com, 22 August 2005. 
14 For example, Lieutenant-General Victory Shumsher Rana 
was appointed ambassador to Myanmar on 13 May 2005 and 
retired Chief of Army Staff Sachchit Shamsher Rana is a 
vocal member of the Rajparishad (Royal Council). 
15 One very senior RNA officer writes frequent opinion pieces 
in the English-language press under the nom de plume of "Ajay 
P. Nath". In an article entitled "Let peace be the priority", The 
Kathmandu Post, 31 August 2005, he argued that, "unless the 
state security forces are strongly beefed up, the terrorists won't 
give up their violent activities and atrocities.…To enforce the 
rule of law, the security agencies have to be effective; for that, 
the whole instrument of national power has to be marshalled 
become further entrenched, it may gain a de facto veto 
on any peace process. 
While the RNA's national role has been extended, it 
remains a feudal army designed primarily to support royal 
power. Its only viable long-term future is as a professional 
army subject to democratic civilian control but no efforts 
in this direction are underway. Instead, the combination of 
less security and a more politicised military has increased 
the obstacles to peace and democracy. 
III. THE MAOISTS AND THE 
MAINSTREAM 
A. THE MAOISTS 
The Maoists have not been weakened since February 
2005. If anything, the prospects are that they will grow 
stronger, although they lack wide popular support, and 
they initially failed to capitalise on the opportunities the 
coup presented. Relative quiescence in the first months 
after the coup may have been caused by disunity within 
the leadership or may have been a planned policy of 
wait-and-see as pressure increased on the palace and the 
parties, but poorly conducted military engagements 
indicated weaknesses in both planning and capacity and 
raised questions about strategic direction. However, 
while the declaration of a strategic offensive in August 
2004 looked premature, a series of attacks that month 
showed that the surprise announcement on 3 September 
of the three-month unilateral ceasefire came from a 
position of strength. 
In March 2005, speculation over a rift in the Maoist 
leadership was fanned by RNA reports that the second-
in-command, Baburam Bhattarai, had been expelled 
from the party. While these reports were both belated 
and exaggerated, the Maoists were forced to admit that 
there was a major debate -- the latest instalment of long-
running disagreements -- within the politburo's standing 
committee and that Bhattarai had been disciplined.16 
However, those who thought this might herald 
disintegration of the leadership were confounded when 
he surfaced in New Delhi in May 2005, accompanied 
not only by party spokesman Krishna Bahadur Mahara 
 
 
behind the legitimate operations of the security forces". The 
chief of army staff has repeatedly praised the royal coup, for 
example in a message to all RNA personnel on RNA Day. 
"RNA committed to democratic values is our vision: Thapa", 
www.nepalnews.com, 9 March 2005. 
16 Forthcoming Crisis Group reports will examine the internal 
politics of the Maoist movement in more detail. 
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but also party chairman Prachanda.17 While press 
statements indicated that ideological and organisational 
disputes continued,18 the movement's unity was publicly 
emphasised. Prachanda confirmed Bhattarai's rehabilitation 
in July.19 
A nationwide reshuffle of local commanders in mid-
2005 may indicate a new phase of operations or further 
consolidation of central power within the party. Indications 
from many districts suggest that local commanders are 
seeking to extend their control of daily life and assert 
their claim to being a parallel government. Military 
actions are turning up the heat on the palace: August 
2005 saw not only the Kalikot success but also attacks 
within Kathmandu Valley and the assassination of a 
royal appointee in mid-western Banke district while 
King Gyanendra was touring it. Meanwhile, attacks on 
industrial targets, combined with effective blockades, 
have underlined the Maoists' ability to wreak economic 
damage. 
The Maoist leaders' Delhi visit was tacitly endorsed 
by the Indian government, its primary purpose being to 
give momentum to tentative efforts at dialogue between 
the Maoists and the mainstream parties. There has been a 
growing recognition within the Maoist leadership that 
an all-out military victory in the near future is not only 
unlikely but would invite immediate external action and 
be unsustainable. This has driven their exploration of 
compromise, involving acceptance of the short-term goal 
of what they term a bourgeois, parliamentary democracy. 
Ideological preparation for such a move has been 
underway for years. A flurry of articles and press releases 
since late 2004 have indicated a willingness to stop short 
of a fully communist state. Prachanda and other leaders 
have repeated that they would respect the results of a free 
and fair election to a constituent assembly tasked with 
preparing a new constitution.20 They have not, however, 
clarified the form of such an assembly and remain vague 
on any timetable for disarmament. 
B. THE MAINSTREAM PARTIES 
The mainstream democratic parties, the primary target of 
the royal coup, have recovered from the initial crackdown 
 
 
17 Crisis Group interviews, New Delhi, May and August 2005. 
18 For example, Baburam Bhattarai's press statement of 25 
May 2005 and Prachanda's statement of 27 May 2005 strongly 
hinted at continuing tensions. 
19 Press statement, 18 July 2005. 
20 See Crisis Group Report, Towards a Lasting Peace in 
Nepal, op. cit., for discussion of the Maoists' position on 
constitutional change. 
and become radicalised against the monarchy. For the 
king's inner circle, February 2005 was a long-delayed 
redressal of the palace's ignominious surrender to a mass 
movement in 1990. The Maoist presence across the 
countryside assisted in the task of stifling political activity. 
Democratic politicians were already losing public 
confidence due to their poor performance and widespread 
negative perceptions about corruption, nepotism and 
factionalism.21 Four major parties had compromised 
themselves by joining the royally-appointed Deuba 
administration in June 2004, a government that was 
never likely to succeed. Participation in it, Unified Marxist 
Leninist (UML) General Secretary Madhav Nepal 
belatedly acknowledged in August 2005,22 was a bad 
mistake. 
The Nepali Congress had refused to join the Deuba 
government. As the parties pulled themselves together 
following the coup, this helped its veteran leader, Girija 
Prasad Koirala, secure de facto leadership of a new 
seven-party alliance, which brought together the major 
mainstream parties with the exception of the royalist 
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) and its offshoot, the 
Rashtriya Janashakti Party (RJP).23 Against steep odds, 
the disparate members of the alliance managed to agree 
on a common minimum program, which addressed the 
restoration of democratic institutions (preferably through 
reinstatement of the 1999 House of Representatives) and 
peace negotiations with the Maoists. 
Beyond maintaining unity and mobilising their supporters, 
the major parties face a testing two-part policy dilemma: 
their perceptions of the Maoists -- whether they will 
negotiate seriously; and their position on the monarchy 
-- whether the groundswell of republicanism should 
be heeded or a compromise preserving a ceremonial 
monarchy is still preferable and possible. The debate 
could split the larger parties, but relief at the Maoists' 
ceasefire announcement and widespread anti-monarchical 
sentiment have driven policy shifts. The UML central 
committee endorsed democratic republicanism in August 
while the Congress' General Convention dropped the 
commitment to constitutional monarchy from the party 
statute. Party leaders have urged diplomats to stop 
referring to the monarchy as "constitutional" and have 
 
 
21 Subsequent Crisis Group reporting will examine the state 
of the mainstream parties and the agenda for their reform. 
22 "Joining Deuba govt was a serious mistake: Nepal", 
www.kantipuronline.com, 15 August 2005. 
23 The RPP commands limited support; it won 10 per cent of 
votes in the 1999 parliamentary elections. The RJP was 
founded in March 2005 by former RPP leader and Prime 
Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa. Despite their royalist stamps, 
both parties have refused to endorse the royal coup. 
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forcefully questioned the rationale for "reconciliation" 
with a palace that seems determined to repress them. 
The king may yet persuade the parties to buy into a 
compromise power-sharing deal, especially Congress, 
some of whose leaders are concerned a more republican 
stance plays into the hands of their left-wing opponents. 
But they would only be tempted by significant concessions. 
For now, the Maoists are making the more attractive offer. 
C. DIALOGUE 
The most significant result of February 2005 has been 
the impetus given to dialogue between the parties and 
the Maoists. Talks underway since shortly after the coup 
gathered momentum following meetings between party 
representatives, facilitators and Maoist leaders in New 
Delhi in May. The prospect of a possible united front 
has alarmed the royal government and its supporters; 
reports such as that of a formal alliance being agreed in 
far-western Humla district caused consternation.24 The 
government's initial response to the Maoist ceasefire 
declaration was ministerial silence and a news blackout 
in the state media; the first on-the-record comments by 
the information and communications minister expressed 
only scepticism about Maoist sincerity.25 
The talks have made some progress. Most importantly, 
they have helped to clarify a theoretical framework 
for a peace process, with both sides able to agree on a 
constitutional assembly as a forum for debating a future 
political system.26 Whatever the pitfalls along such a 
route, this is a major step towards a realistic agenda. It 
also suggests that those who insist a palace-party alliance 
is the only starting point for a peace process are too 
restrictive. Initial achievements have included a sense 
among mainstream politicians that the Maoists have eased 
pressure on their rural activists,27 in line with a series of 
public statements promising to respect human rights, and 
a specific commitment to cease physical attacks on non-
combatants.28 The ceasefire announcement is a logical 
further step. 
 
 
24 See "Maoists, parties hold district-level talks", The 
Kathmandu Post, 29 July 2005 and P.G. Rajamohan, "Nepal: 
The stalemate that isn't", South Asia Intelligence Review 4(4), 8 
August 2005. 
25 "Govt expresses scepticism over Maoists' ceasefire 
announcement", www.kantipuronline.com, 5 September 2005. 
26 See Crisis Group Report, Towards a Lasting Peace in 
Nepal, op. cit., for an explanation of the Maoists' and parties' 
approaches to the constitutional assembly model for change. 
27 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu and New Delhi, August 
2005. 
28 Prachanda, press statement, 19 June 2005. 
It is also significant that the dialogue is being handled 
relatively professionally despite the lack of external 
assistance: each side has stuck to realistic objectives 
and recognised the difficulty of addressing the larger 
differences; talks were deliberately slowed to ensure 
that various parties could buy into the process before 
it advanced too far; and the press statements have 
been well coordinated. In August 2005, the seven-
party alliance agreed to appoint a joint team for formal 
negotiations, accepting an offer made by Prachanda more 
than a month earlier, without ceding him the credit 
that hasty acceptance would have implied. 
Nevertheless, much of this appears to have been managed 
by the Maoists for their own purposes, and there is 
no guarantee the talks will succeed. There are major 
differences which cannot be bridged easily. The Maoists 
will find it hard to give up the advantages they have won 
through violence and will have to be persuaded that there 
are benefits in joining the mainstream. The parties may be 
keen to talk but they are not likely to give the Maoists the 
benefit of the doubt, especially in view of the murders of 
hundreds of their workers. Doubts about longer-term 
Maoist sincerity are legitimate; insistence that they can 
make a principled compromise has not been accompanied 
by any obvious change in the political culture of the 
movement. 
By declaring a unilateral ceasefire, the Maoists have 
taken the initiative to convince the world of their 
willingness to compromise. Prachanda's announcement 
recognised that, "we are also well aware that a lot of 
people doubt our political commitment because of our 
resistance to the feudal political dictatorship. We have 
done our best to remove those doubts, working towards 
building an atmosphere of mutual trust, to be able to go 
for a progressive political solution".29 
D. CIVIL SOCIETY 
It is encouraging that civil society has been more active 
and influential than many predicted. While not able to 
intervene decisively in the conflict, it could play a more 
critical role in mobilising the Kathmandu middle class, 
whose democratic aspirations tipped the balance in 1990 
but which has become disaffected with party politics. 
Recent demonstrations led by the Citizens' Movement for 
Democracy and Peace (CMDP) have made a powerful 
statement against autocracy, royal or Maoist. They have 
attracted many participants who are scathing in their 
 
 
29 Press statement, 3 September 2005. 
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criticism of the major parties' failings but refuse to accept 
that as justification for denial of their democratic rights.30 
However, civil society cannot supplant organised political 
parties. This is not lost on civil society leaders themselves, 
who have focused much of their effort on urging the 
parties to reform and win back popular trust. One of the 
main protest organisers summarised: "We are not in a 
position to run a political movement ourselves -- that's the 
job of the parties, and we lack their capacity and control. 
But they still don't seem to have learned enough lessons 
from their mistakes in office. We're hoping that they 
learn quickly and fulfil their role responsibly".31 The high-
profile CMDP events have also prompted suspicions 
among the parties, with the UML launching its own 
parallel movement to counter a perceived pro-Congress 
bias.32 
Throughout the post-coup period, the press has played 
a remarkable role, with journalists constantly pushing, 
often successfully, at the bounds of censorship. The 
royal government has been unable to sustain the harsh 
crackdown of early February, and a critical press has 
kept pressure on the palace and the Maoists to abide by 
international norms. Civil society go-betweens also 
played an important role in helping the party-Maoist 
dialogue get off the ground. However, such activities 
are much easier in the capital and larger towns. In the 
countryside, there is less protection, and neutrality is 
much harder to maintain. 
The Maoists have never had much urban support and 
may not feel threatened by unarmed civilians in the 
capital. But for the king, the streets of Kathmandu are 
pivotal. Palace advisers will have already sensed the 
growing parallels with the mass democracy movement 
of 1990. Protests are being led not only by dedicated 
political activists but also by middle-class professional 
associations, trade unionists, artists and poets. If this 
movement gathers pace, it should also worry the 
Maoists. As a CMDP leader put it, "I don't know why 
[outsiders] want to flood Nepal with weapons to protect 
us from the Maoists. Do they think that after all these 
struggles for democracy we'll just roll over and let the 
Maoists rule us?"33 
 
 
30 Crisis Group interviews with demonstrators, Kathmandu, 
25 July 2005. 
31 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, August 2005. 
32 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu and New Delhi, August 
2005. 
33 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, July 2005. 
IV. THE PRESSURES MOUNT 
A. ECONOMIC DETERIORATION 
Throughout the first nine years of the Maoist insurgency, 
Nepal remained remarkably, and paradoxically, stable. 
Political instability in the countryside and in central 
government did not translate into economic crisis; safety 
valves such as easier migration to India and a growing 
remittance economy cushioned displacement from the 
hills. While fuelling Maoist expansion, the collapse in 
rural government services was not disastrous for a 
population accustomed to state neglect. The conflict did 
not entirely derail development work, even in projects 
funded by the Maoists' supposed arch-enemies, the U.S. 
and India. Average GDP growth remained above 5 per 
cent -- not great by regional standards, but not bad -- and 
Kathmandu experienced something of a boom, fuelled 
partly by conflict-induced migration from the hills. 
But there is no guarantee this apparent stability will 
last indefinitely. Indeed, signs of deterioration have 
already appeared in all areas. 
1. Fiscal pressures 
Nepal faces an economic squeeze: fiscal crisis is not 
imminent but mounting pressures will harm business 
confidence and may add to popular unrest. While the 
budget announced in July 2005 is predicated on 4.5 per 
cent growth, growth slowed to 2 per cent in the fiscal 
year 2004-2005. A poor harvest, feared by analysts 
following low early monsoon rainfall, could push the 
economy into negative growth.34 Poor relations with 
donors make a simple bail-out highly unlikely, although 
healthy foreign currency reserves provide a cushion of 
several months. Conflict-induced changes in rural social 
structures may also compound difficulties and increase 
the number of vulnerable families, especially those 
without remittance income to fall back on. Foreign 
investment has stagnated over the last two years; major 
domestic investors are reportedly moving some of their 
assets out of the country. The budget deficit for 2005-
2006 is estimated at $650 million,35 of which the 
finance ministry hopes to cover $480 million through 
foreign loans and grants. While around two-thirds of 
the development budget has been financed by foreign 
aid in the past, only half the projected loans were 
realised in 2004. 
 
 
34 Crisis Group interviews with development economists, 
Kathmandu, July and August 2005. 
35 Figures denoted in dollars ($) in this report refer to U.S. 
dollars. 
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Economic woes should not be exaggerated. Nepal has a 
good record for maintaining macro-economic stability in 
unpromising circumstances, and poverty alone does not 
dislodge regimes. But for a government already fighting 
on many fronts, a downturn in the economy brings extra 
pressures. Some of the fiercest street protests followed a 
hike in state-subsidised petroleum products in August 
2005. Shortages and price-rises caused by the Indian 
trade blockade in 1989 fed the "people's movement" 
that toppled the Panchayat system. Any damage to 
Kathmandu residents' basic comfort would spell serious 
trouble for the king in his sole stronghold. 
2. Development difficulties 
Even sympathetic donors complain about the lack of 
meaningful dialogue with the royal government. "To 
say that relations are at a low ebb would be an 
understatement", commented a representative of a major 
bilateral donor. "Our ministers are determined not to 
make aid a political football but there is a vast gap 
between our and the government's analysis of the current 
situation, and they just won't talk to us realistically about 
their development goals".36 The worsening security 
situation and Maoist consolidation across the country 
is bringing donors closer to a critical decision point. 
The Maoists are seeking to exert more and more control 
over rural development activities, either by issuing 
direct instructions or by working through community 
organisations. The country director of Swiss Development 
Cooperation has commented that, "it is surprising to see 
development agencies, small and large, local as well as 
multilateral, hide behind a vague and self-serving concept 
of 'communities' and pretend that the latter can create 
and defend the 'space for development' in a violent 
environment".37 
Wholesale changes at the Social Welfare Council, which 
regulates NGO and INGO work, may also constrict 
development projects, especially if the proposed new 
code of conduct is as politically restrictive as some 
experts fear. Major development partners share a sense of 
unease. Norway has pulled out of the flagship Melamchi 
water project, and other countries have kept their 
assistance under review. According to a senior aid 
official, the Asia Development Bank is still "deeply 
exercised" over the Deuba corruption conviction; it is not 
processing many outstanding 2004 loans and is holding 
all 2005 loans.38 The World Bank is also pessimistic, 
threatening future Poverty Reduction Support Credit and 
possibly overall lending levels, and the International 
 
 
36 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, July 2005. 
37 Jorg Frieden, "Imagined communities", Nepali Times, 12 
August 2005. 
38 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, August 2005. 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility for Nepal could go formally off track.39 Britain's 
Department for International Development (DfID) 
has completed a full post-coup review of its program, 
concluding that spending in this financial year is likely to 
be around $27 million lower than originally budgeted.40 
Donor confidence will be affected by the extent to which 
they are allowed to operate in accordance with their basic 
operating guidelines. Positive indications from the 
government and the Maoists have not yet translated into 
sufficient concrete demonstrations of goodwill. 
3. Humanitarian concerns 
Nepal faces a human rights protection crisis but not 
currently a humanitarian crisis. There are, however, 
increased risks of a serious humanitarian situation, 
especially in relation to internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). The first wave of people forced out of conflict-
affected areas were mostly those best placed to cope, 
among them landlords and political party activists. Many 
of these were able to travel with resources and settle 
in relative comfort elsewhere. More recent IDPs have 
tended to be poor, often lower caste people, forced 
out due to specific threats from either the Maoists or 
the RNA, including the Maoist drive to recruit one fighter 
from every family. Those who remain in heavily conflict-
affected areas are more vulnerable because of the slow 
collapse of basic infrastructure, caused not so much by 
government withdrawal as the loss of key local leaders 
and Maoist suspicion of community-based organisations. 
There is also an increasing incidence of sudden mass 
displacement, the most notable example being the flight 
of around 30,000 Kapilvastu villagers following vigilante 
violence in March 2005. 
The UN is preparing a Consolidated Appeal (CAP) 
to be launched in early October, based on a common 
humanitarian strategy that is being developed in 
consultation with the Nepali government, local and 
international NGOs, donors, the Red Cross and 
international experts. A UN official stressed that, 
"we don't want to imply that traditional development 
cooperation should be abandoned but there is an urgent 
need to fill emerging gaps in the provision of essential 
services and prepare for potentially dangerous 
humanitarian contingencies".41 Nevertheless, some 
development practitioners are worried that existing 
efforts could be undermined by a broad-brush 
humanitarian approach, and the finalised CAP will no 
doubt reflect such concerns. 
 
 
39 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, August 2005. 
40 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, July 2005. 
41 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, August 2005. 
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B. POLITICAL DISCONTENT 
The government suffers from a lack of legitimacy, 
growing popular discontent and international isolation, 
all problems for which it lacks solutions. It has made 
no progress in addressing the insurgency and faces 
economic, developmental and humanitarian challenges. 
It has been thrown off balance by the Maoist ceasefire 
announcement and is unsure how to respond. The king 
still commands the loyalty of the RNA but this is a 
brittle form of power that will offer limited options 
if mainstream dissent increases. The royal coup was 
undertaken with limited planning: the general aim of 
replacing the political mainstream with power structures 
directly answerable to the palace was not accompanied 
by detailed thinking in other areas. This lack of strategy 
may prove fatal to the royal government: absorbed by 
long-term efforts to reshape the political system, it may 
be overtaken by immediate challenges for which it has 
no answers. 
Crude efforts to suppress mainstream dissent have led 
only to renewed pressure from parties, student 
movements, trade unions, professional associations 
and civil society. The royal government has seemed 
determined to alienate almost all potential supporters 
and it has often been its own worst enemy: for example, 
just as opposition was building elsewhere, it decided to 
ban trade unions within the civil service. This prompted 
heightened discontent among government bureaucrats 
already unhappy at being subjected to close military and 
palace supervision. 
By early August 2005, the policy vacuum had become 
painfully apparent. Ministers, who have in any case been 
granted no real authority, appeared to make up policy on 
the spot to avoid difficult questions. Council of Ministers 
Vice Chairman Kirtinidhi Bista appeared to reverse the 
spirit of the l1 February royal proclamation when he 
declared that the government was, after all, prepared 
to talk to the Maoists.42 He was, however, promptly 
repudiated by his colleague, Tanka Dhakal, Information 
and Communications Minister. More bizarrely, Finance 
Minister Madhukar Shamsher Rana suggested there 
could be a referendum to test whether republicans or 
monarchists had greater support.43  
Escalating street protests in Kathmandu will put more 
direct pressure on the government. They will continue to 
be led not only by the seven-party alliance but also by 
civil society groups, professional associations, trade 
 
 
42 "Govt ready for talks with Maoists: Bista", www.kantipur 
online.com, 5 August 2005. 
43 "Nation can go for referendum: FM Rana", The Kathmandu 
Post, 6 August 2005. 
unions and students. Discontent is not confined to party 
politicians but has permeated crucial constituencies, 
including an increasingly sceptical business community. 
Organisations such as the Professional Alliance for Peace 
and Democracy, which unites the major lawyers', 
journalists', doctors', teachers' and engineers' associations, 
are taking their campaign to the districts. Businesspeople 
outside the capital, aware that the king has failed to 
improve security and is damaging their prospects, are 
restive. "None of us supports what the king has done", 
says a prominent regional businessman. "We all want to 
see the end of this government as soon as possible".44 
Reconciliation between the palace and mainstream 
parties is not theoretically impossible but is in practice a 
forlorn hope. The king has amply demonstrated that he 
will spurn opportunity to compromise, however much it 
may be in the interests of the monarchy and the country. 
The mainstream parties, convinced that his plan is to do 
away with democracy, are in an uncompromising mood. 
While a superficial deal may yet be possible, there is no 
chance of a seriously united anti-Maoist front. 
The notion that the constitutional monarchy and 
multiparty democracy are, in India's favoured phrase, 
the "twin pillars" of stability in Nepal is now widely 
questioned. As the king's own senior vice chairman of 
the Council of Ministers has bluntly put it, one has to 
choose between supporting the palace or the parties -- 
it is not possible to support both at once.45 Three years 
of attempts to persuade the parties to accommodate the 
ambitions of an autocratically inclined monarchy have 
only helped the Maoists to expand. 
C. LOOKING BEYOND ROYAL RULE 
The monarchy's support base is narrow and conditional, 
consisting primarily of the RNA. In the coming months, 
the royal government is likely either to collapse or to 
be replaced under pressure with some time-buying 
compromise. Governments of the last few years, including 
all royally-appointed administrations, have tended to 
survive around nine months. There are no good reasons 
to expect this government to buck that trend: determination 
not to give ground to the parties is not a sufficient policy 
response to the multiple mounting pressures. 
There can be little doubt that of the three power centres in 
Nepal -- palace, parties and Maoists -- it is the palace that 
has been most gravely weakened since February 2005. 
 
 
44 Crisis Group interviews with Nepali businessmen, New 
York, June 2005. 
45 "Strengthen either monarchy or democracy, not both: Dr. 
Giri", www.nepalnews.com, 7 July 2005. 
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The mainstream parties that had served as the 
constitutional monarchy's strongest bulwark now offer 
a limited choice of "absolute democracy" (in which the 
monarch would be a powerless figurehead) or outright 
republicanism. The Nepali Congress has removed 
endorsement of the constitutional monarchy from its 
constitution while the UML has adopted the goal of a 
democratic republic. More radical politicians and student 
leaders have already placed republicanism firmly on the 
agenda and see a good chance of achieving their goals. 
The end of Nepal's monarchy, or its reduction to a 
ceremonial vestige, is increasingly likely. It is still not 
inevitable but any other outcome would depend on a 
reasonable compromise, something that the palace is 
unwilling to countenance. The king is not like his late 
brother, Birendra: he is likely to see any concessions to 
the parties as a personal indignity, and these feelings 
will be reinforced by the clique he has surrounded 
himself with. 
In the absence of compromise, there is a real danger that 
hardcore monarchists will conclude that a final, brutal 
crackdown is their only option. If the monarchy is backed 
into a corner -- something the king's consistent ruling out 
of concessions makes more likely -- and they feel they 
have nothing to lose, the growing street protests could be 
much more bloodily suppressed than in 1990. A sudden 
collapse of palace authority would bring with it the risk of 
a power vacuum, potentially allowing the Maoists to seize 
a decisive advantage. The only acceptable option in this 
case would be to ensure the RNA accepts the direction of 
an emergency all-party government strongly supported by 
a united international community. 
D. RESPONDING TO THE CEASEFIRE 
The Maoists' 3 September 2005 declaration of a three-
month ceasefire has been widely welcomed and has 
raised new hopes of serious talks to end the conflict. The 
seven-party alliance and civil society groups have 
urged the Maoists to observe the ceasefire sincerely 
and the government to respond in kind. But the royal 
administration met the declaration with a studied silence 
and questioned the Maoists' intentions. Some members 
of the cabinet and palace advisers reportedly support a 
reciprocal truce but for the time being the war party, 
including most of the RNA's senior officers, has more 
influence, and it has urged the king to keep on fighting.46 
Observers report efforts by the RNA to expand its 
activities into rural areas that had been ceded to Maoist 
 
 
46 Crisis Group interviews with political leaders, diplomats 
and journalists, Kathmandu, September 2005. 
control and believe this is designed to force the insurgents 
to break their ceasefire.47 
India offered the first international response, stating, "we 
hope that the ceasefire announced by the Maoists will 
contribute towards creating an environment in which 
a peace process can begin".48 The use of the term "peace 
process" brings Delhi's language more into line with that 
of the Europeans; who would be involved in such a 
process or what form it would take, however, was left 
deliberately vague.49 Donors and the European Union 
also welcomed the ceasefire, with the latter calling for 
a "democratically based peace process…involving a 
national consensus and reintegration of the CPN-M 
[Commnist Party of Nepal-Maoist] into a multi-party 
democracy",50 while the U.S. made no comment. 
Mainstream political parties, the Maoists and civil society 
representatives have called for a more active UN role.51 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted this in his response 
to the Maoist ceasefire, saying he hoped that, "all sides in 
Nepal will take all measures which will lead to peace 
talks".52 The UN could now take the initiative to broker a 
wider ceasefire between the armed parties, a move that 
would receive broad support within Nepal and much of 
the international community. 
V. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
The royal government has antagonised its traditional 
allies. The coup had been widely predicted, and India, the 
U.S. and UK had firmly warned the king against it. Not 
surprisingly, the coup met with stiff external opposition. 
The king could have redeemed himself had he played 
his cards carefully but his diplomacy has been 
counterproductive. While the palace courted Washington, 
it boasted of support from China, North Korea and Cuba. 
While royal associates worked their Hindu fundamentalist 
connections, others were busy talking up the chance of 
 
 
47 Crisis Group interviews with human rights workers and 
political leaders, Kathmandu, September 2005. 
48 "Press release by MEA, GOI, New Delhi regarding recent 
developments in Nepal", Indian Embassy press release No. 
Kat/64/2005, 5 September 2005. 
49 Crisis Group interview with Indian diplomats, Kathmandu, 
September 2005. 
50 "Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union in response to the statement of cease-fire by Chairman 
Prachanda, CPN(M)", Brussels, 6 September 2005, 11988/05. 
51 For example, leaders of the seven-party alliance wrote to 
Kofi Annan on 6 September 2005 asking for the "greater 
support and understanding of the international community to 
stop our country from sliding towards a failed state". 
52 Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-
General on Nepal, New York, 5 September 2005. 
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arms from Pakistan. India, despite certain apparently 
conciliatory gestures, will not enthusiastically support 
this government and does not believe it can last long. 
As noted, it was quick to offer a guarded welcome to the 
Maoist ceasefire, while noting the shifts in Congress and 
UML policy as well as the views of civil society.53 UK 
and EU positions against royal autocracy have hardened, 
and the U.S. is realigning itself more unambiguously in 
favour of democracy. 
A. INDIA 
India led the condemnation of the royal coup and largely 
set the tone for a firm international response. However, 
it lacks a clear longer-term policy, and its positions 
have been the result of much debate within the Delhi 
establishment, some of it embarrassingly public. The 
army has pushed hard on behalf of the RNA, while the 
palace has frantically worked its Indian aristocratic 
connections to buy more breathing space. The left 
parties supporting the ruling United Progressive Alliance 
coalition, however, have strongly pressed the government 
to support restoration of democracy and a negotiated end 
to the conflict. India has sustained its freeze on lethal 
military assistance since February 2005 and despite 
announcing resumption of non-lethal aid has delivered 
very little. At the same time it has encouraged the Maoists-
parties dialogue, much of it conducted on Indian territory. 
While frustration with the king has mounted, the Indian 
leadership is unwilling to renounce its traditional support 
for the "twin pillars" of monarchy and multiparty 
democracy. Nevertheless, strong suggestions that it 
is time to move towards a new line have come from 
influential and knowledgeable quarters. Former 
ambassador to Nepal Deb Mukharji has urged replacing 
the "twin pillars" with a policy that puts Nepal's people 
at the centre.54 Such thinking echoes private discussions 
in government policy circles, where scepticism that the 
monarchy will survive King Gyanendra's adventurism 
has grown significantly but is yet to be reflected in 
public statements.55 
The change in mood was underlined when Defence 
Minister Pranab Mukherjee, who is sympathetic to the 
RNA and palace, publicly voiced his disappointment at 
the former's ineffectiveness and linked it to the derailment 
 
 
53 "Press release by MEA, GOI, New Delhi regarding recent 
developments in Nepal", Indian Embassy press release No. 
Kat/64/2005, 5 September 2005. 
54 “Initiate action for talks”, The Kathmandu Post, 13 August 
2005. 
55 Crisis Group interviews, New Delhi, May and August 2005. 
of the constitution and multi-party democracy.56 When 
the RNA reacted to its embarrassing loss in Kalikot in 
August 2005 by blaming its Indian-supplied rifles, Delhi 
responded icily that, "our extensive experience of conflict 
situations has taught us that success does not depend on 
the weapon alone….If the Royal Nepalese Army is of 
the view that its understanding of this weapon is still 
incomplete, then the Government of India will be happy 
to again make arrangements to address their doubts".57 
Policy has consistently suffered from indecisiveness and a 
lack of serious planning; there is still no sign that recent 
actions form part of a coherent longer-term strategy. 
Moreover, continuing wariness of cooperating too closely 
with the U.S. and UK, let alone the UN and smaller 
countries, has hampered efforts to increase international 
leverage. There have been signs, such as behind-the-scenes 
collaboration in the run-up to the Commission on Human 
Rights session, that a more collaborative multilateral 
approach is possible but follow-through has been limited. 
As a senior third-country diplomat puts it, "India's 
analysis and actions just do not match. They insist that 
Nepal is in crisis but they don't appear to have a plan to 
deal with it. Maybe they are planning quietly but it would 
be good if they could reassure us".58 
B. CHINA 
China has maintained quiet but not unconditional support 
for the palace. The royal government's hopes that it will 
meet all financial as well as military equipment needs are 
not realistic, though it has received $12.5 million in 
budgetary support.59 Delhi has most reasons for concern 
about Beijing's role but senior diplomats remain confident 
that bilateral ties are too important to be upset by bickering 
over Nepal. China may well try to increase its influence 
but only within limits, and with the understanding it 
cannot supplant India and has no reason to try.60 
Beijing may well respond to the request for military 
assistance by selling ammunition and aircraft -- it is keen 
to prevent a growth of U.S. influence in Nepal. Apart 
from concern for the stability of Tibet, however, its 
principal focus is on business opportunities rather than 
politics. Its support for the palace reflects historically 
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close ties but does not preclude backing alternative 
arrangements should it become convenient. As a diplomat 
observed, "Nepalis view China with a sense of awe rather 
than familiarity. China knows there will be little price 
to pay for supporting the king as any future democratic 
leadership will reconcile itself to dealing with them 
regardless".61 
C. THE UNITED STATES 
The U.S. criticised the royal coup but came to be widely 
seen as close to the palace and lukewarm about restoration 
of democracy. It gave the appearance of having swallowed 
uncritically the king's false dichotomy of "me or the 
Maoists" and his assurances of commitment to democracy. 
Unlike India and the European Union, it did not welcome 
the seven-party alliance's call for restoration of parliament. 
Instead it urged the parties to adopt policies more 
acceptable to the palace. According to a senior envoy, the 
U.S. also worked behind the scenes to try to block Indian 
efforts to support the Maoist-parties dialogue.62 
The U.S. position -- influenced by sympathy for the RNA 
as much as for the palace -- has changed somewhat, 
primarily because of domestic concerns. The State 
Department's Donald Camp used his June 2005 visit to 
focus more clearly on democracy and question the king's 
true intentions. However, some pro-palace bias remains. 
Opposition Senator Patrick Leahy complained the 
following month that the embassy in Kathmandu was 
still "sending mixed messages that have been widely 
interpreted as giving equal consideration and validity 
to the views and actions of the King and the political 
parties", while the king himself was "using the army and 
police to crush the forces of democracy".63 
Ambassador James Moriarty not only argues that 
cooperation between the "constitutional forces" of palace 
and parties is the sole possible alternative to a Maoist 
victory but also insists on describing the palace as a 
"legitimate political actor".64 He sees the corrupt and anti-
democratic actions of the royal government as going 
"against its core principles" rather than being in line with 
its true nature. Nevertheless, his sharp criticism of the 
course since February 2005 suggests that the U.S., UK 
and India have come closer to a common assessment. 
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62 Crisis Group interview with Western diplomat, Kathmandu, 
July 2005. 
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D. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The UK's condemnation of the royal coup was 
accompanied by much more scepticism about the king's 
attitude towards democracy than Washington showed. 
Ambassador Keith Bloomfield has been trenchantly 
critical of the march towards authoritarian consolidation. 
Looking back at six months of post-February rule 
under the pretext of restoring peace and strengthening 
democracy, he noted: 
…[a] new and very different mentality…in which 
those who argue for a negotiated peace with the 
Maoists are publicly attacked for advocating giving 
in to terrorists, where democracy is presented as 
something that has to wait until the Maoists have 
been dealt with militarily, where there is no room 
for moderation and compromise -- you either 
support those in power or you are seen as being 
sympathetic to the Maoists.65 
Following former Prime Minister Deuba's conviction on 
corruption charges, Bloomfield wrote him a personal 
letter of support, which was leaked to the press. The UK 
plays a pivotal role in shaping international cooperation, 
having the ear of both Washington and New Delhi while 
maintaining the largest Kathmandu mission of all EU 
member states. It has taken a firm public stance for 
democracy and a negotiated settlement to the conflict. 
However, it is uncertain how to adjust policy to conform 
to its revised analysis. 
E. EUROPEAN UNION 
The EU is a major developmental aid player but has 
struggled to find a major political role. The UK 
presidency (July-December 2005) may be the best chance 
to draw Brussels into higher-level collaboration with 
other key countries and the UN. The EU's newly-agreed 
strategic partnership with India could prompt closer 
dialogue with New Delhi on the regional security 
implications of Nepal's conflict.66 A major reason for 
the EU's ineffectiveness is the limited representation 
of member states in Kathmandu. The only sizeable 
presence is the British, who often prefer to emphasise a 
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complex and long-standing bilateral relationship at the 
expense of joint initiatives. Yet, the EU is a potentially 
crucial member of a better coordinated international front, 
and it will surely contribute to peace process support and 
post-conflict assistance. The appointment of a senior 
envoy as an EU Special Representative would encourage 
more serious political engagement with international 
partners as well as prepare the ground for closer 
cooperation once a peace process is underway. 
F. JAPAN 
Tokyo avoids high-profile diplomacy but is a significant 
donor and has consistently diverged from the line taken 
by other major aid givers. It has continued to provide 
substantial direct budget support to the royal government. 
Japan will not offer military aid but does ally closely with 
the palace, primarily as a fellow Asian monarchy. It has 
not criticised the royal coup and invited Crown Prince 
Paras to visit in July 2005. Like India, Japan has been 
keen to secure Nepal's vote for UN reform and expanded 
permanent membership of the Security Council. 
G. THE UNITED NATIONS 
The UN has long been significant for development 
but the conflict has drawn it toward new roles. The 
agreement signed by the royal government and Louise 
Arbour, High Commissioner for Human Rights, in April 
was a major event that authorised establishment of a 
large mission with broad powers to engage both armed 
parties and to monitor and report on their conduct. The 
Maoists welcomed this, and it will be the first time they 
have had to face a concerted test of their sincerity and 
capacity to cooperate. While the mission will not be 
fully operational until October, key staff have been 
appointed and it has started work on the ground. The 
UN is also increasingly coordinating humanitarian and 
other contingency planning. 
Nevertheless, the UN's political role remains unclear. 
Secretary-General Annan has repeatedly expressed 
concern at the deteriorating situation and offered his 
good offices to help resolve the conflict. In July 2005 
this concern was underlined by the six-day visit of his 
special adviser, Lakhdar Brahimi, which raised the level 
of attention given to Nepal although India resisted it. 
Brahimi's subsequent visit to New Delhi revived hopes 
for closer cooperation between these two key players. 
The UN retains broad respect among the parties to the 
conflict and would be best placed to push for a wider 
ceasefire and assist a negotiating process. 
VI. A NEW ENGAGEMENT 
King Gyanendra's actions have demonstrated that the 
choice he has advertised between democracy and stability 
is a false one. His own autocratic measures have palpably 
increased instability, not restored a degree of order. 
Meanwhile, the Maoist ceasefire declaration has raised 
the question of what kind of peace process the international 
community should support. Most influential members 
refused to accept the royal coup as a fait accompli. Their 
criticism moderated the initial crackdown and has 
continued to act as a brake on the most excessive 
behaviour. But their pressure has been neither well 
coordinated nor related to clearly defined benchmarks. If 
the international community is to be an effective force for 
peace it must address its lack of unity, lack of clarity on 
longer term goals, poor communication and unimaginative 
policy formulation. 
It must also face up to the fundamental questions about 
the monarchy that permeate Nepali society. Outsiders 
should not decide the country’s political institutions, 
but to insist that Nepal must retain a "constitutional 
monarchy" is to do just that. It hands the king a veto on 
any progress to peace and prejudges the outcome of 
any constitutional revision process. It also seems 
increasingly out of step with domestic opinion. It may 
well be that the king's control of the army buys him 
a place at any negotiation but that depends on his 
willingness to talk. Furthermore, as with the Maoists, 
power should not in itself legitimate a political actor. 
While domestic actors reshape the political landscape, 
the international community can help. As long as internal 
dynamics remain in flux and may throw up their own 
peace opportunities, there is no need for heavy-handed 
external mediation. But Nepal's friends should be clearer 
about their principles and the role they may play in 
helping a negotiated peace as and when the opportunity 
for substantive talks arises. They should: 
Prepare for a Peace Process 
 welcome the Maoist ceasefire, urge its indefinite 
extension, government reciprocity, and for all 
parties to the conflict to seize the opportunity for 
substantive talks; 
 press the UN to take the lead in brokering an 
extended and unconditional ceasefire between 
the armed sides and with the backing of 
mainstream political parties; 
 support the dialogue between the mainstream 
parties and the Maoists if it shows signs of leading 
towards a negotiated, democratic peace; 
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 plan to facilitate talks if requested by the 
participants, as well as to provide technical and 
financial assistance in the later stages of a peace 
process; and 
 make a thorough assessment on the ground of 
the military situation and specifically of the 
RNA and be prepared to mitigate its potential 
role as a peace spoiler. 
Maintain Pressure on the Palace 
 press the royal government to revive democratic 
institutions and open the path to a negotiated 
peace settlement; and 
 continue the freeze on military aid, suspend all 
general budgetary support, introduce targeted 
sanctions such as travel bans for palace advisers, 
ministers, generals and their families and prepare 
to freeze royal assets held abroad. 
Develop Fresh Policies 
 recognise that the traditional recipe of calling for 
the "twin pillars" -- king and parties -- to work 
together has not worked, and there is a need for 
a new, more open-minded, policy; 
 as long as there remains a chance that the king 
may see sense, continue to search for imaginative 
compromises that can keep him in the picture and 
lead to a democratically negotiated peace; but 
 agree to work together to advance a set of basic 
common principles for a democratic peace 
settlement, which should centre on a negotiated 
peace, multiparty democracy, respect for human 
rights and a military accountable to civilian 
control. 
Support Democracy 
 continue visible engagement with democratic 
political forces, including the parties, the media 
and civil society; and 
 press for the RNA to start the process of 
democratisation and conversion into a national 
army accountable to elected civilian control. 
Coordinate Better 
 ensure more effective multilateral action, preferably 
through a loose contact group that can follow a 
common policy; in particular, the EU, U.S. and 
India should work more closely with the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Secretary-
General's special adviser; 
 hold a follow-up to the 2002 London International 
Conference on Nepal to discuss common principles 
and policies;67 and 
 increase the EU's role, perhaps by appointing a 
Special Representative for Nepal to improve 
European policy coordination and work alongside 
other major players. 
Make Contingency Plans 
 prepare for a possible reconfiguration of power 
in Kathmandu and develop contingency plans for 
the collapse of the royal government, including 
coping with a possible power vacuum and 
escalated violence; and 
 prepare to meet greater humanitarian needs 
and, while continuing development work where 
feasible, support the UN's Consolidated Appeal 
and its efforts to engage the government, donors, 
NGOs and others in contingency planning. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 15 September 2005
 
 
67 The 2002 London International Conference on Nepal was 
the first attempt to coordinate the international community's 
response to the growing crisis in Nepal. It brought together 
the security, political and development policymakers of 
twenty governments and international bodies. 
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